The Catholic Lawyer
Volume 13
Number 3 Volume 13, Summer 1967, Number 3

Article 8

The New York Statutory Defense of Entrapment: Need for a
Judicial Gloss

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

13

CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER

1967

time for action is the first few months
following childbirth. Evidence points to
the first months of the child's life as the
period when neglect disrupts the integrative capacity of infant perceptual systems. It is during this period that parents
either mature and master their parental

The implementation of any new procedures and the expansion of existing

roles or allow the family to disintegrate.

price which must be paid.

82

ones will be costly. But the prevention
of wasted lives and the elimination of
the torture many infants must endure are
ends which are well worth any monetary

82 Morris, Gould & Matthews, Toward Prevention of Child Abuse, 11 CHILDREN 55, 60
(1964).

THE NEW YORK STATUTORY DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT: NEED
FOR A JUDICIAL GLOSS
With the enactment of the Revised
New York Penal Law, effective September 1 of this year, the legislature has
clearly established that the defense of
entrapment will be available in all criminal proceedings instituted under the new
law.' Essentially, the statutory defense

REV. PEN. LAW § 35.40 provides that:
In any prosecution for an offense, it is
an affirmative defense that the defendant
engaged in the proscribed conduct because
he was induced or encouraged to do so by
a public servant, or by a person acting in
cooperation with a public servant, seeking
to obtain evidence against him for purpose
of criminal prosecution, and when the
methods used to obtain such evidence were
such as to create a substantial risk that
the offense would be committed by a
person not otherwise disposed to commit
it. Inducement or encouragement to commit
an offense means active inducement or

is based on conduct by a government
agent designed to induce an otherwise
innocent person to engage in criminal
activity for the purpose of prosecution.
Since the provision itself contains little
more than a brief statement as to the
availability of the defense, this note shall
examine the problems which will necessarily be encountered by the New York
courts when confronted with problems of
policy, interpretation and procedure.

encouragement. Conduct merely affording
a person an opportunity to commit an
offense does not constitute entrapment.
Prior to the enactment of the statute,
the prevailing judicial view was that the
defense of entrapment was not available.
See People v. Mills, 178 N.Y. 274, 70 N.E.
786 (1904).
However, there were some
lower court decisions in New York which
gave the defense limited recognition. See,
e.g., Pettalino v. State, 24 App. Div. 2d
524, 260 N.Y.S.2d 322 (3d Dep't 1965);
People v. Williams, 38 Misc. 2d 80, 237
N.Y.S.2d 527 (County Ct. 1963).

NOTES

AND COMMENTS

Supreme Court Cases
Although there is no federal statute
authorizing the plea of entrapment as a
defense, such a defense has been recognized by the federal courts since the
early 1900's.2 While no precise definition
of entrapment has evolved, it is generally
accepted that the defense arises when
the criminal design originates in the
minds of the arresting police officials, or
their agents, who persuade or induce the
accused to perpetrate a criminal act that
he would not otherwise commit. Where
the police merely provide an opportunity
for the commission of a crime the element of entrapment is not present, since,
in such a case, the criminal intent has
originated in the mind of the defendant,
independent of police activity. A difficult
question arises, however, when neither a
clear indication of a pre-existing criminal
intent on the part of the defendant exists,
nor can the conduct of the police be
characterized as unduly persuasive. In
such cases, the decisions are found to be
restricted to the precise facts and have
failed to espouse any definitive standards.
There are, however, two Supreme
Court decisions which have set out the
broad policy considerations and reviewed
the several procedural issues inherent in
the defense of entrapment. These decisions must be considered of utmost importance in understanding the defense of
entrapment in New York since the Commission Staff Notes to the section in the

2

See Woo Wai v.

United

412 (9th Cir. 1915).
3See
United States v.
1007,

1008 (2d Cir.

States,

Becker,
1933).

223

62

F.

F.2d

Revised Penal Law state that the "formulation [of the defense] is based upon the
federal standards as enunciated" in these
4
cases.
In Sorrells v. United States,5 decided
in 1932, the defendant had been indicted
for the possession and sale of a halfgallon of whiskey in violation of the National Prohibition Act. The evidence
showed that the arresting agent had repeatedly requested that the defendant sell
him some liquor. The officer had played
on the sympathies of the defendant,
stressing the fact that they were former
"comrades-in-arms" and had been in the
same "outfit" during the war. The trial
court refused to sustain the plea of entrapment and ruled as a matter of law
that the defense was unavailable. The
Supreme Court, reversing, characterized
the conduct of the government as a gross
abuse of authority:
It is well settled that the fact that
officers or employees of the Government
merely afford opportunities or facilities
for the commission of the offense does
not defeat the prosecution. Artifice and
stratagem may be employed to catch
those engaged in criminal enterprises.
A different question is presented
when the criminal design originates with
the officials of the Government, and
they implant in the mind of an innocent
person the disposition to commit the
alleged offense and induce its commis6
sion in order that they may prosecute.
Since the evidence clearly showed that
the defendant was not predisposed to
4 S. Intro. No. 3918, A. Intro. No.
Comm'n Staff Notes § 75.05 (1964).
5287 U.S. 435 (1932).
6 Id. at 441-42.
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commit the criminal act but rather the
government agent had actively induced
and encouraged the commission of the
crime, it was held, as a matter of law,
that an entrapment situation existed and
that entrapment was a valid defense.
The Court stated that it could not have
been the intent of Congress, in passing
the prohibition statute, to allow a conviction where entrapment was present.
Thus, the legal basis for the Court's decision was not that entrapment is always
a defense, but, rather, that as a matter
of statutory construction, there was an
implied legislative intent that the particular statute before the Court permitted
entrapment as a defense.
Although the concurring justices agreed
with the result, they were in complete
disagreement with the rationale of the
majority's holding. Their opinion was
based on the inherent power of a court
to prevent a party from using the judiciary to perpetrate an injustice. Thus,
an analogy can be drawn between the
doctrine of "clean hands" in the law of
equity and that of entrapment in criminal proceedings. To say, as did the majority, that someone who has clearly
violated the law is not guilty is "merely
to adopt a form of words to justify action which ought to be based on the
inherent right of the court not to be
made the instrument of wrong." 7 It was
also argued that the majority had erred
in finding a legislative intent to preclude
convictions in cases of entrapment in regard to the statute in question. This, it
was stated, "is not merely broad construction, but [the] addition of an ele-

CATHOLIC LAWYER,

SUMMER

ment not contained in the legislation," "
and the defendant cannot be adjudged
innocent on such flimsy reasoning. The
majority opinion was further criticized on
the ground that it had failed to provide
a guideline which the lower courts could
employ in the future to resolve cases
involving other criminal statutes.
An important procedural determination that had been made by the majority
was that, while they had decided the
issue in Sorrells as a matter of law, in a
proper case entrapment was a jury question. The concurring justices believed
that in all cases the court should be the
final arbiter of the issue, the jury occasionally being consulted on an advisory
basis. This view of the concurring justices was in accord with their basic assumption that the issue of entrapment
was essentially one with which the court
was exclusively concerned.
The final aspect of the decision in
Sorrells was the view of the majority that
the predisposition of the defendant was
relevant to the determination of entrapment. The concurring justices urged that
such evidence should not be admitted.
The conduct at issue is that of the police,
not that of the accused.
To say that such conduct by an official
of government is condoned and rendered
innocuous by the fact that the defendant
had a bad reputation or had previously
transgressed is wholly to disregard the
reason for refusing the processes of the
court to consummate an abhorrent
transaction. 9
8 Ibid.

7Id.

at

456

(concurring

opinion).
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I1ld. at 459

(concurring

opinion),
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The Supreme Court did not again review the issue of entrapment until the
1958 case of Sherman v. United States.'0
In that case, a government informer became acquainted with the defendant in
the waiting room of a doctor's office,
when it appeared that both were receiving treatment as narcotic addicts. After
several accidental meetings at the office
and at a neighboring pharmacy, the two
became sufficiently friendly to discuss
their mutual affliction. The informer repeatedly spoke of his difficulty in responding to treatment, and asked the defendant to aid him in obtaining drugs.
In an obvious feeling of empathy towards
a fellow sufferer, the defendant reluctantly agreed to purchase sufficient drugs
to satisfy both their needs and did so on
a cost-plus-expenses basis. After several
such transactions, the informer notified
his contact at the Bureau of Narcotics,
who, after observing three "sales," arrested the defendant. At the trial, the
jury, appropriately instructed on entrapment, found the defendant guilty. On
these facts, the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the defense of entrapment
had been established as a matter of law.
As in Sorrells, the Court was drawn
into conflict as to the basis for the defense and the procedure governing its
application. The majority, to a large
extent, reiterating the position of the
Court in Sorrells, stated that the fundamental problem in determining whether
entrapment exists is to distinguish "between the trap for the unwary innocent
and the trap for the unwary criminal." 11

The concurring opinion stressed the
argument advanced previously by the
concurring justices in Sorrells, that entrapment should be permitted as a legitimate defense rather than as a result of
statutory construction. It was asserted
that the courts do not free defendants
because of a presumed legislative intent;
they do so because "the methods em-

1,1356 U.S. 369
'lid. at 372.

'l

(1958).

As a solution to this problem it was
stated that although the accused may
examine the conduct of the alleged entrapper, at the same time he "will be
subjected to an 'appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and
predisposition' as bearing on his claim of
innocence."'1 2 The majority believed that
to exclude entirely all evidence of the
predisposition of the defendant would
place an unwarranted handicap on the
prosecution. As in Sorrells, the legal
basis of the majority's opinion was that
the statute in question impliedly authorized the defense of entrapment.
In a highly critical concurring opinion,
the validity of the majority's view of the
defense was questioned.
It is surely sheer fiction to suggest
that a conviction cannot be had when
a defendant has been entrapped by
government officers or informers because 'Congress could not have intended
that its statutes were to be enforced
by tempting innocent persons into violations. . . .' [Cionduct is not less
criminal because the result of temptation, whether the tempter is a private
person or a government agent or informer."'

12Id.

at 373.

id. at 379-80 (concurring opinion).
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ployed on behalf of the Government to
bring about conviction cannot be countenanced." 14 Whether the defense is established, it was contended, must be decided solely on the basis of the conduct
of the police. Therefore, the past record
and inclination of the accused to criminality are irrelevant 15 and, in fact, by
raising such issues, the court may ultimately deprive the defendant of an
impartial jury.
The danger of prejudice in such a
situation . . . is evident. The defendant
must either forego the claim of entrapment or run the substantial risk that
. . . the jury will allow a criminal record
or bad reputation to weigh in its determination of guilt ...
1
Despite the rather full discussion afforded the defense in these two opinions, 17 several questions remain unanswered. In the main, they concern: the
14

1d. at 380.

l Id. at 382-83.
Id. at 382. It was further noted by the
concurring justices that by allowing the character of the defendant to be a controlling
factor, the Court was, in effect, negating the
rehabilitative purpose of criminal incarceration.
Id. at 383.
17 The
defense of entrapment has been accorded mention in more recent Supreme Court
decisions.

In Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.

427, 434 (1963), the Court noted that many of
the issues inherent in the defense have become "mooted" by the discussions both in
and following its early decisions and refused
to reconsider them in light of the fact that
the petitioner's "belated" claim of entrapment
was "insubstantial." The government agent in
question was making available to the defendant
"an opportunity for the continuation of a
course of criminal conduct, upon which . . .
[he] had earlier voluntarily embarked.
Id. at 436.
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burden of proof; the extent to which
evidence of predisposition will be allowed; inconsistent defenses; and who
may be the entrapper. It is, therefore,
necessary to examine lower federal court
decisions to ascertain how, and to what
extent, these problems have been resolved.
The Burden of Proof
In the federal courts the issue of entrapment has been, in essence, narrowed
to two questions of fact. First, did the
government agent induce the accused to
commit the crime and second, if he did,
was the accused ready and willing without
persuasion to commit the crime, i.e.,
merely awaiting an opportunity to perpetrate the offense."' The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals has stated that the defendant has the burden of proof on the
first issue and the prosecution has the
19
burden on the second.
Thus, in the federal courts, when the
defendant raises the issue of entrapment
he must present "at least some showing
of the kind of conduct by government
agents which may well have induced the
accused to commit the crime charged." 20
In order to justify a jury verdict in his
favor he must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the tactics used
by the police were objectionable in that
they would induce a person not otherwise disposed to commit a crime, to do

'sSee

Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435

(1932).

19United States v. Shuman, 200 F.2d 880,
882-83 (2d Cir. 1952), rev'd on other grounds,

356 U.S. 369 (1958).
20 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 435

(1963).
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SO. 21 This view has been adopted by the
Model Penal Code 22 as well as the Revised New York Penal Law. 23 The Model Penal Code takes the position that the
portion of the proceeding devoted to entrapment is, in essence, a separate
complaint by the entrapped person
against the state which has caused him
to commit a crime. Since he is the
"plaintiff" he should be required to establish his case by a preponderance of
24
the evidence.
In the federal courts, the defendant
will not be required to introduce his evidence until the prosecution has fully presented its case. Assuming, therefore, that
a prima facie case has been presented,
in establishing entrapment he may rely
on pertinent aspects of the government's
evidence as well as any evidence of his
own. When the issue of entrapment is
raised, the court may, in its discretion,
allow the prosecution to reopen its case
and put forth such evidence as is deemed
necessary to show that the crime was
committed, not at government inducement but, rather, by a person predisposed

to commit it.2 5

The New York Revised Penal Law
provides that the issue of entrapment is
an affirmative defense to be proved by
the defendant by a preponderance of the
evidence.26
No mention is made as to whether the
defendant, to satisfy his burden of proof,
must show both the government's inducement to commit the crime and the defendant's unwillingness to act without
such persuasion. In the federal courts
the defendant must merely establish the
former and the prosecution has the burden of proof as to the latter. Since the
New York entrapment defense is modeled
after the federal rule, 27 it is most likely
that New York will follow this concept
of dual burden of proof as enunciated
by the federal courts.
Defendant's Predisposition
It has been held that before the government may invite or induce the commission of a crime it must have a "reasonable suspicion" that, not withstanding
their efforts, the person intends to engage
25 Johnson

2'-Gorin v. United States, 313

F.2d 641, 654

(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963).
22 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10(2), Comment
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). Under the Code
there is no necessity for a jury instruction
since the judge decides the issue. Ibid.
23 REV. PEN. LAW § 35.40 states that entrapment is an affirmative defense. Section 25.00(2)
provides: "When a defense declared by statute
to be an 'affirmative defense' is raised at a
trial, the defendant has the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the
evidence."
24 MODEL
PENAL CODE
§ 2.10(2), Comment
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).

v.

United

States,

317

F.2d

127

(D.C. Cir. 1963); Hansford v. United States,
303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962). It should
be noted that the First Circuit Court of
Appeals has recently held that it will no
longer consider the matter of police inducement as a separate issue. The defendant must
merely show some indication that the government conduct corrupted him and the burden
of disproving entrapment will then fall upon
the government. Kadis v. United States, 373
F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1967). This will have no
effect on the New York law since the statute
clearly calls for a preponderance of the
evidence.
2,6

27

REV. PEN. LAW § 35.40.
S. Intro. No. 3918, A. Intro. No.

Comm'n Staff Notes § 75.05 (1964)....

5376,
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in criminal activity and they are merely
affording him an opportunity to do so.
It is not necessary, however, to show
"probable cause." 2s The primary question to be answered, in deciding whether
the defendant was predisposed to commit
a crime, is in whose mind did the criminal intent originate. Federal courts have
unanimously held that where the defendant indicates his desire to commit a crime
to an officer who then formulates the
situation wherein the arrest may be made,
the defense of entrapment is rendered
29
unavailable.
Where, however, the evidence of preformed intent is not self-evident and the
defendant raises the issue of entrapment,
the prosecutor may subject his conduct
to a "searching inquiry" and present cogent evidence to demonstrate that he was
30
already disposed to commit the offense.
An integral part of this inquiry is the
introduction of evidence concerning the
defendant's past criminal record which
bears some relation to the crime charged
and other indicia of his propensity to

2S

Childs v. United States, 267 F.2d 619, 620

(D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 948
(1959).
29 E.g.,
Kivette v. United States, 230 F.2d
749 (5th Cir. 1956); United States v. Grimm,
50 F. 528 (E.D. Mo. 1892), aff'd, 156 U.S.
604 (1895). "It cannot be regarded as a valid
excuse for a crime that some one has afforded
the accused a convenient opportunity to commit it, for the purpose of testing his honesty."
50 F. at 531. It has therefore been held that
the defendant's 'immediate response to an
agent's suggestions is adequate evidence of
predisposition. United States v. Wallace, 269
F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1959).
30Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,
7
373 (1958).
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crime. 31 It has also been held that a
later offense than the one charged may
be admitted into evidence to indicate the
predisposition to commit the earlier
2
crime.3
The general rule that the defendant's
past criminal record may be introduced
into evidence is subject to criticism. It
is apparent that even a criminal with an
extensive police record may decide to end
his illegal career. Thereafter, police inducement to commit crime would have
substantially the same effect on him as it
would on a person who did not have a
previous criminal record. In such a case
the criminal record of the defendant
would be totally irrelevant and would
serve merely to prejudice the defendant
in the eyes of the jury. In addition, the
emphasis on the character and disposition of the accused has served to draw
attention away from the conduct of the
police, i- a matter subject to close scrutiny
by the Supreme Court as presently constituted. By allowing each case to rest
on the defendant's actions in the past, no
set rule cad be laid down to guide or
limit permissible activity by the police.
Clearly, the decision in Miranda v.
Arizona, by setting out specific rules regarding the warnings required prior to
any valid in-custody interrogation, evinces
a strong desire to standardize police conduct in an effort to protect a suspect's
constitutional rights. Therefore, to permit the defense of entrapment to exist

3' United

States v. Sherman,

209

F.2d 880,

883 (2d Cir. 1952).
32Gonzales v. United States, 251 F.2d 298,
299 (9th Cir. 1958).
33MODEL
PENAL CODE §2.10(1), Comment
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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on an ad hoc basis would appear to circumvent this strong precedent for an
orderly and well-defined scheme of law
enforcement.
The New York statute does not specify
what evidence may be introduced in order to prove the accused was, or was not,
predisposed to commit the crime. The
Commission Staff Notes, however, state
that
the main thrust of the section is against
pressure methods which may cause the
commission of an offense by one who
is not ordinarily disposed to commit
it. As a practical matter, therefore, the
defense of entrapment would not be
available to the person who regularly
34
engages in illegal enterprise.
The Commission Staff Notes tend to
indicate that the New York courts will
probably follow the federal cases and
allow evidence of past crimes, pre-existing intention and other indicia of predisposition. It would seem that since a
strong legislative command is absent in
the statute, the issue of predisposition is
an appropriate subject for re-evaluation
by the New York courts. While it is
manifest -that inducement per se cannot
be made a complete bar to prosecution
without giving some consideration to the
conduct of the defendant, it is equally

Intro. No. 3918, A. Intro. No. 5376,
See
Comm'n Staff Notes § 75.05 (1964).
United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d
Cir. 1933), wherein it is stated that "it has
been uniformly held that when the accused is
continuously engaged in the proscribed conduct,
it is permissible to provoke him to a particular
violation which will be no more than an
instance in a uniform series." Id. at 1008.
34S.

evident that the conduct of the defendant
may not be the most important issue at
stake in the proceedings.
Inconsistent Defenses
A central issue concerning entrapment
is the permissibility of utilizing the defense in conjunction with a plea of not
guilty. The federal cases in the ninth
circuit have uniformly held that where
the defendant denies guilt of the crime
charged he may not also assert that he
was entrapped. 35 "It logically follows
that absent the commission of a crime
there can be no entrapment." 36 The fifth
circuit, however, has chosen to draw a
finer distinction, holding that the defense
of entrapment is available although the
defendant pleads not guilty provided that
he admits commission of one or more of
the alleged overt acts stated in the indictment.3 7 It was stated that the real
test of inconsistency is whether the de3s
fenses necessarily disprove each other.
Since it cannot be foretold before proof
is offered whether the defense of entrapment is, in fact, inconsistent with the
innocence of the defendant, it would appear that both pleas should be permitted. 39 To prohibit the defendant at
the outset from asserting the defense of
entrapment when he pleads not guilty
would force him to relinquish his right

3 Ortiz v. United States, 358 F.2d 320 (9th
Cir. 1966); Ortega v. United States, 348 F.2d

874 (9th Cir. 1965); Eastman v. United States,
212 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1954).
3"Eastman v. United States, 212 F.2d 320,

322 (9th Cir. 1954).
37 Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169
(5th Cir. 1956).
39Jd. at 172.

39 Id. at 173.

13
to the defense. 40 Surely the defendant
should not be denied this right when it
appears from the evidence presented that
there was an element of active inducement involved. 4 1 Further, the fifth circuit
has made it clear that by pleading innocent the defendant automatically raises
the issue of entrapment since "all possible defenses not raised by appropriate
motion are embraced within the plea of
not guilty."'42 However, the raising of the
defense acts as an admission to the basic
physical elements of the crime charged,
i.e., placing the defendant at the scene of
the crime and the commission of at least
some overt act. 4' Therefore, where the
defendant claims he did not commit the
acts alleged to constitute the crime because he was not present, or because
someone else did so, he may not assert
that he was entrapped.
The entrapment section of the Revised
New York Penal Law makes no mention
ot the problem of inconsistent defenses.
Because of the conflict between the circuits, it is impossible to indicate with
any degree of certitude what rule the
New York courts will adopt. It is submitted, however, that the rule found in
the fifth circuit is sounder since it does
not require the defendant to relinquish
his defense of entrapment unless it is,
in fact, inconsistent with a plea of not
guilty.
44 See
4'

4 HOUSTON

L. REV.
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The Trier of Entrapment: Judge or Jury
The decisions of the Supreme Court
in both Sorrells and Sherman hold that
the issue of entrapment is a jury question." The court may rule on the defense only where it can be found as a
matter of law that entrapment has, or
has not, been established.4 5 The concurring opinions in both Sorrells and
Sherman took the view that the issue of
entrapment should always be decided by
the court. The Model Penal Code has
also adopted this view. 46 The drafters of
the Model Penal Code believed that since
the predisposition of the defendant is
subject to a searching inquiry, the defense could only be presented to the jury
at a "great price to the defendant."
4

It would appear that the position taken
by the concurring justices in Sorrells and
Sherman and the Model Penal Code is
the most equitable since it prevents the
jury from being informed of the defendant's character and past criminal record.
There can be little doubt that evidence
presented to the jury of this nature has
the effect of prejudicing the defendant in
the minds of the jury. At the very least,
the court might be given the opportunity
to review the evidence, prior to its submission to the jury, thereby eliminating
to some extent the damage flowing from
what later would clearly be irrelevant or
prejudicial testimony.

158 (1966).

Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139 (5th

Cir. 1965).
42 Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d
169,
172 (5th Cir. 1956).
43Rodriguez v. United States, 227 F.2d 912
(5th Cir. 1955).
Accord, Marko v. United
States, 314 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1963). See
also Hamilton v. United States, 221 F.2d 611
(5th Cir. 1955).

41 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 377

(1958);

Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.

435, 452 (1932).
4.1Sherman

v. United States, 356 U.S. 369

(1958).
PENAL CODE §2.10(2),
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).

46MODEL

47

Ibid.
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It is to be hoped that the New York
courts in examining this important procedural determination will consider the
efficacy of reserving the issue to the
court. Until such time as they do so,
however, it must be assumed that they
will follow the federal rule as enunciated
by the majority opinions in Sorrells and
Sherman.
The Entrapper
While the federal courts have held that
the defense of entrapment does not usually extend to inducements by private
citizens, the defense is available where
a government officer acts through such a
person.4 8 Both the Revised New York
Penal Law and the Model Penal Code
have adopted this view. 49 However clear
this distinction may appear on its face,
great pressure is thereby placed on the
government to disavow any connection
with the entrapper in order to sustain a
conviction. The test of whether a government officer acts through a private
citizen, utilized by Sherman, was whether
there was a pre-existing relationship between the entrapper and the police.

48

Johnson v.

United

States,

317

F.2d

127

(D.C. Cir. 1963). In Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369 (1958), the fact that the in-

former was not paid for his activity was
rejected as a basis for treating him as a
private citizen, since it was apparent that he
expected to receive mitigation of his sentence
on a prior conviction. The problem of the
use of informers has consistently found itself
before the courts. However, as a general rule
they have been held to be an integral part of
law enforcement. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
4,1 REV. PEN. LAW § 35.40; MODEL PENAL CODE
§2.10(1)

(Tent. Draft No. 9,

1959).

Therefore, the defense would be available where an informer, who has continuing contacts with the police, induces
the defendant to commit a crime and
proceeds to inform the officers of the
trap. Where, however, a private citizen,
not connected with the police, induces
the commission of a crime and then
brings the evidence to the police, the defense is unavailable. This view would
appear to be sound since the conduct
directly in point in cases of entrapment
is that of the public official 50 and not
that of private citizens. Where neither
the government nor its agents induces the
commission of the crime, there appears
to be no valid basis for the defense.
New York
It has been stated that the courts of
New York do not recognize the availability of the defense of entrapment.51
This belief appears to find its roots in
the lower court case of Board of Comm'rs
v. Backus.5 2 In this case it was stated
that the Board of Excise could, if needed, take such steps as it found necessary
to apprehend those who violated the law,
including the paying of informers and
agents to go upon the defendant's premises to purchase liquor in order to convict him of failing to obtain a liquor
license.
50"The purpose of the defense is to deter
misconduct in enforcing the law. When private
individuals or groups become part of law
enforcement, through active or passive cooperation of officials, they must meet the standards
appropriate to the officers themselves." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.10(2), Comment (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1959).
51S.

Intro.

No.

3918,

A. Intro.

No. 5376,

Comm'n Staff Notes § 75.05 (1964).
52 29 How. Pr. 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864).
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The decision of the Court of Appeals
in People v. Mills," handed down in
1904, is most often cited as the controlling case on entrapment in New
York.5 4 In Mills, it was the defendant's
intention to suppress, by bribery, indictments in the possession of the district
attorney's office; the defendant, however,
after conferring with a member of that
office, and upon his encouragement, perpetrated the crime of theft of public
documents. The Court held immaterial
the defendant's contention that he would
not have committed the offense but for
the temptation provided by the public
official.
We are asked to protect the defendant,
not because he is innocent, but because
a zealous public officer exceeded his
powers and held out a bait. The courts
do not look to see who held out the
bait, but to see who took it.,5

There were two vigorous dissents to
the majority opinion. The first dissent
was based on the offensive conduct of
the state, and its representatives, in effecting the commission of a crime.
When the state and its officers come
into a court of justice demanding the
punishment of a person accused of crime
they ought to appear there with clean

hands and not as a part of the forces

LAWYER,

SUMMER

1967

that procured the consummation of the
56
unlawful act.

--

The other dissent concentrated on the
origin of the intent to commit the specific
crime charged. It was emphasized that
the defendant's intention was to perpetrate the crime of bribery of a public
official; the crime of theft of public documents was the product of the minds of
the prosecution and the state. 7
Although the controlling interpretation
of the Mills case has been that the defense of entrapment is not available in
New York, there have been several lower
court cases which, at the very least, allude to the existence of such a defense
and suggest the need for its application.
In an early appellate division case"'
where a conviction of attempted abortion
had been brought about by a trap set by
the officers of the county medical society,
the court stated that the defendant
was not a passive instrument in the
hands of the entrapping parties. He did
the act with which he was charged
voluntarily, with full knowledge of the
subject and of the consequences which
would flow therefrom. Under such circumstances setting a trap by which he
was caught is not a defense.5 9

In
178 N.Y. 274, 70 N.E. 786 (1904).
In Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412
(9th Cir. 1915), the court noted that, in its
view, Mills was not a case of entrapment since
the intent to commit a crime had originated
in the mind of the defendant and he had
approached the district attorney in an attempt
to consummate this plan.
5, People v. Mills, 178 N.Y. 274, 289, 70 N.E.
786, 791 (1904).

CATHOLIC

1965,

another

appellate

division

53

54

56 Id. at 304, 70 N.E. at 797 (dissenting
opinion).
7 Id. at 306-07, 70 N.E. at 798 (dissenting
opinion).

58 People v. Conrad, 102 App. Div. 566, 92
N.Y.S. 606 (1st Dep't), aff'd without opinion,

182 N.Y. 529, 74 N.E. 1122 (1905).
59d, at 567-68 (emphasis added).

NOTES

AND

COMMENTS

case,6" affirming, without opinion, a lower
court conviction of attempted grand larceny, contained a strong dissent on the
The dissenting
issue of entrapment.
judge believed that the defense of entrapment had been legitimately raised, and
therefore, should have been submitted to
the jury as a question of fact.
In a recent lower court case, People
v. Williams,61 the court stated that, despite the decision in Mills, defendant had
a right to raise entrapment as a factual
issue since "the Mills case did not outlaw
a defense of entrapment in New York
State as has been generally assumed.
,"62 The court reasoned that the
facts of Mills did not present an entrapment situation since it was found that
the criminal intent had originated with
the defendant and not with his tempters.
It is readily conceivable that situations
will arise wherein as a result of compulsion, duress, deceit, misrepresentation, or
constant pressure a defendant might be
entrapped into the commission of crime.
No civilized and, moral society could
63
countenance such a conviction.

The court went on to hold, however,
that, as a matter of law, entrapment was

69 People v. Roper, 24 App. Div. 2d 560, 250
N.Y.S.2d
1008
(1st Dep't), afl'd without
opinion, 17 N.Y.2d 711, 269 N.Y.S.2d 718

(1965).
61 38 Misc. 2d 80, 237 N.Y.S.2d 527 (County
Ct. 1963). See also Pettalino v. State, 24
App. Div. 2d 524, 260 N.Y.S.2d 322 (3d

Dep't 1965). But see People v. Schacher, 47
N.Y.S.2d 371, 372 (City Magis. Ct. 1944),

not present in the case before it. As this
case indicates, the New York courts have
not conclusively foreclosed the possibility
of the adoption of entrapment as a defense in New York. The hesitancy of
the New York courts to recognize the
defense of entrapment may well result in
a restrictive interpretation of the new
4
statutory defense.
Conclusion
By enacting the entrapment section in
the Revised New York Penal Law, the
legislature has taken the initiative in establishing the availability of this defense
in New York. Unfortunately, they have
done so without solving the various procedural problems inherent in the recognition of the defense. It is hoped that
this deficiency will be rectified by the
inclusion of detailed procedural provisions in the expected revision of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. In lieu of this it
is urged that the New York Court of
Appeals, at the earliest opportunity,
make known its views on these problems.
The Commission Staff Notes are of some
aid in the area of legislative intent in
that they state that the defense is intended to be a codification of the federal
entrapment rule as enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Sorrells and Sherman.
However, in view of the fact that these
two cases provide only the bare procedural foundation of the defense and that
areas of conflict have arisen between the
circuits, the brief allusion to a federal
(Continued on page 265)

a list of cases from different states
regarding the defense of entrapment see Comment, The Doctrine of Entrapment and Its

wherein the court stated that "it is well settled

64For

that entrapment is not recognized as a defense
in New York State."
6238 Misc. 2d at 83, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
63 Id. at 84, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 532.

Application in Texas, 9 Sw. L.J. 456, 465 n.44
(1955).

RECENT DECISION

quently hesitate in informing the client of
the legal principles involved.
These remarks are offered as a suggested course of action which an attorney
in defendant's position should take in
light of the holding in the instant case.
But, it should be noted that prior to this
holding, defendant had carefully evaluated his contemplated course of action
and sought the advice of several prominent members of the profession. These
men, whose judgment is not to be taken
lightly, basically approved of defendant's
plan. Defendant's reward for his diligent

efforts was an eighteen-month suspension.
This case should emphatically demonstrate the need for a more precisely drafted code.

ENTRAPMENT

misconduct of the police, then the disposition of the defendant to commit a
crime is at best a secondary issue and
the evidence presented on this question
will be limited. On the other hand, if
the conduct of the police merely forms
the basis of the defense, then any evidence having bearing on the defendant's
predisposition must be admitted. It is to
this extent that a definitive policy statement is of paramount importance. The
defense of entrapment has been available
in federal proceedings for over half a
century without a final resolution of the
more difficult questions involved in its
use. This must not be allowed to become
the case in New York.

(Continued)

rule would seem a clearly insufficient basis
on which to ground the application of the
defense in New York.
Another inadequacy in the new entrapment section is the failure to establish a
strong policy to guide the courts. Such
a policy is essential to the procedural
determinations which will have to be
made when the defense is pleaded. An
example of the necessity for a consistent
policy is the problem, previously discussed, of the extent to which evidence
showing predisposition will be allowed.
If the section is directed primarily at the

It is also submitted that additional
canons should be drafted to deal specifically with the activities of the criminal
lawyer. The gravity of the issues involved
in a criminal case, plus the special consideration generally given defense lawyers
in criminal cases, militate towards an
explicit recognition of the distinction by
the Canons.

